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Abstract 
We establish a theoretical as well as empirical framework to assess the role of resource 
endowments and their geographic location for inter-State conflict. The main predictions of 
the theory are that conflict tends to be more likely when at least one country has natural 
resources; when the resources in the resource-endowed country are closer to the border; and, 
in the case where both countries have natural resources, when the resources are located 
asymmetrically vis-a-vis the border. We test these predictions on a novel dataset featuring 
oilfield distances from bilateral borders. The empirical analysis shows that the presence and 
location of oil are significant and quantitatively important predictors of inter-State conflicts 
after WW2.  
 
Keywords:  conflict, natural resources, territorial war, energy economics 
JEL Classifications:  Q34 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Macro Programme. The Centre for Economic 
Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
We wish to thank Johannes Boehm, Patrick Luescher, Cyrus Farsian and Wenjie Wu for 
excellent research assistance. Helpful comments from Luis Corchon, Tom Cunningham, 
Oeindrila Dube, Joan Maria Esteban, Erik Gartzke, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Hannes Mueller, 
Peter Neary, Nathan Nunn, Costantino Pischedda, Giovanni Prarolo, Jack Snyder, Silvana 
Tenreyro, Mathias Thoenig, Andrew Wood, Pierre Yared, Fabrizio Zilibotti, and conference 
and seminar participants in Barcelona, Bocconi, Copenhagen, East Anglia, Harvard, 
Lausanne, Lucerne, Munich, NBER Political Economy Programme, NBER Income 
Distribution and Macroeconomics Programme, Oxford, Princeton, SED, St. Gallen, ThReD, 
York, and Zurich are gratefully acknowledged. 
 Francesco Caselli is the Macro Programme’s Director at the Centre for Economic 
Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science.  He is also Norman 
Sosnow Professor of Economics at LSE. Massimo Morelli is Professor of Political Science 
and Professor of Economics at Columbia University. Dominic Rohner is an Assistant 
Professor in Economics at the University of Lausanne. 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval 
system or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of 
the publisher nor be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it 
is published. 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent 
to the editor at the above address. 
 
 F. Caselli, M. Morelli and D. Rohner, submitted 2013 
1 Introduction
Natural riches have often been identied as triggers for war in the public debate and in
the historical literature.1 The contemporary consciousness is well aware, of course, of the
alleged role of natural resources in the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqs invasion of Kuwait, and the
Falklands war. At the moment of writing, militarized tensions involving territorial claims
over areas known, or thought, to be mineral-rich exist in the South China Sea, the East
China Sea, the border between Sudan and South-Sudan, and other locations. But the his-
torical and political science literatures have identied a potential role for natural resources
in dozens of cases of wars and (often militarized) border disputes, such as those between
Bolivia and Peru (Chaco War, oil, though subsequently not found), Nigeria and Cameroon
(Bakassi peninsula, oil), Ecuador and Peru (Cordillera del Condor, oil and other minerals),
Argentina and Uruguay (Rio de la Plata, minerals), Algeria and Morocco (Western Sa-
hara, phosphate and possibly oil), Argentina and Chile (Beagle Channel, sheries and oil),
China and Vietnam (Paracel Islands, oil), Bolivia, Chile, and Peru (War of the Pacic,
minerals and sea access).2
However, beyond individual case studies there is only very limited systematic formal
and empirical analysis of the causal role of resources in conict, and of the underlying
mechanisms. This paper aims to begin to ll this gap.
The key idea of the paper is to relate the likelihood of conict between two countries to
the geographical location of natural-resource deposits vis-a-vis the two countriesbilateral
1E.g. Bakeless, 1921; Wright, 1942; Westing, 1986; Klare 2002; Kaldor, Karl, and Said, 2007; De Soysa,
Gartzke, and Lie, 2011; and Acemoglu et al., 2012.
2References for these conicts include: Price (2005) for Nigeria-Cameroon, Franco (1997) for Ecuador
and Peru, Kocs (1995), for Argentina and Uruguay and Algeria and Morocco, BBC (2011) for Alge-
ria and Morocco, Anderson (1999) for China and Vietnam, Carter Center (2010) for the War of the
Pacic. Other examples of (militarized) border disputes over areas (thought to be) rich in oil and
other resources include Guyana-Suriname, Nicaragua-Honduras, Guinea-Gabon, Chad-Libya, Bangladesh-
Myanmar, Oman-Saudi Arabia, Algeria-Tunisia, Eritrea-Yemen, Guyana-Venezuela, Congo-Gabon, Equa-
torial Guinea-Gabon, Greece-Turkey, Colombia-Venezuela, Southern and Northern Sudan (cf. Mandel,
1980; McLaughlin Mitchell and Prins, 1999; Carter Center, 2010).
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border. The reasoning is simple: reaching, seizing, and holding on to areas belonging
to another country is progressively more di¢ cult and costly the further away these areas
are from the border. The further an advancing army has to go, the more opportunities
the defender has to stop the advance, the longer and more stretched the supply lines
become, the greater the likelihood that the local population will be hostile, etc. Therefore,
if countries do indeed engage in military confrontations in order to seize each others
mineral reserves, as hypothesized in the case-study literature, they should be relatively
more tempted when these reserves are located near the border. Accordingly, we ask whether
countries are more likely to nd themselves in conict with countries with mineral deposits
near the border than with countries with minerals far away from the border.
As a preliminary check on the plausibility of this, Figure 1 presents a simple scatterplot
which suggests that the geographic location of oil deposits could be related to cross-country
conict. Each point in the graph is a country pair. On the vertical axis we plot the fraction
of years that the pair has been in conict since World War II, while on the horizontal axis
we measure the (time average of) the distance to the bilateral border of the closest oil
eld. (Clearly only country pairs where at least one country has oil elds are included).3
The graph clearly shows that country pairs with oil near the border appear to engage in
conict more often than country pairs with oil far away from the border [the correlation
coe¢ cient is -.11 (p-value: 0.01)].
The crude correlation in Figure 1 could of course be driven by unobserved heterogeneity
and omitted variables. For example, it could be that some countries that have oil near the
border just happen to be more belligerent, so that country-pairs including such countries
spuriously ght more often. Hence, the rest of the paper engages in a more careful, model-
based empirical investigation that controls for omitted factors, including country xed
e¤ects, and is sensitive to the issue of border endogeneity.
To see the benet of focusing on the geographical location of resource deposits, contrast
our approach with the (simpler) strategy of asking whether countries are more likely to
3Note that for visual convenience we have trimmed both axes, removing the 1% outliers with highest
levels on the axes. The data in the gure is described in detail in Section 3.1.
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Figure 1: Oil distance from the border and bilateral conict
nd themselves in conict with neighbors who have natural resources than with neighbors
that are resource-less. There are two shortcomings of this strategy. First, it tells us little
about the mechanism by which resource abundance a¤ects conict. For example, it could
just be that resource-abundant countries can buy more weapons. Second, the potential
for spurious correlation between being resource-rich and other characteristics that may
make a country (or a region) more likely to be involved in conict is non-trivial. For both
reasons, while we do look at the e¤ects of resource abundance per se, we think it is crucial
to complement the analysis with the geographical information.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no theoretical model that places conict inside a
geographical setting. Given the prominence of the concept of territorial war, this omission
may seem surprising. Hence, we begin the paper by developing a simple but novel two-
country model with a well-dened geography, where each country controls some portion of
this geography, so there is a well-dened notion of a border, and where the two countries can
engage in conict to alter the location of the border. This provides a simple formalization
of territorial war.
We use our model of territorial war to generate testable implications on the mapping
from the geographical distribution of natural resources to the likelihood of conict. We
assume that each of the two countries may or may not have a resource deposit (henceforth
oil, for short). The one(s) that have oil have the oil at a particular distance from the initial
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bilateral border. If a war leads one of the two countries to capture a portion of territory
that includes an oil eld, the control over the oil eld shifts as well.
Compared to the situation where neither country has oil, we show that the appearance
of oil in one country tends to increase the likelihood of conict. In particular, the height-
ened incentive of the resource-less country to seek conict to capture the others oil, tends
to dominate the reduced conict incentive of the resource-rich country, which fears losing
the oil. Similarly, ceteris paribus, the likelihood of conict increases with the proximity
of the oil to the border: as the oil moves towards the border the incentive of the oil-less
country to ght increases more than the incentive for the oil-rich one is reduced. Finally,
when both countries have oil, conict is less likely than when only one does, but more likely
than when there is no oil at all. More importantly, conditional on both countries having
oil, the key geographic determinant of conict is the oil eldsasymmetric location: the
more asymmetrically distributed the oil elds are vis-a-vis the border the more likely it is
that two oil-rich countries will enter into conict. The overall message is that asymmetries
in endowments and location of natural resources are potentially important determinants
of territorial conict.
While our theory applies to any type of resource endowment, our empirical work fo-
cuses on oil, for which we were able to nd detailed location information (and which is the
resource most commonly conjectured to trigger conict). We test the models predictions
using a novel dataset which, for each country pair with a common border (or whose coast-
lines are relative near each other), records the minimum distance of oil wells in each of the
two countries from the international border (from the other countrys coastline), as well as
episodes of conict between the countries in the pair over the period since World War II.
We nd that indeed having oil in one or both countries of a country pair increases the
average dispute risk relative to the baseline scenario of no oil. However, this e¤ect depends
massively on the geographical location of the oil. When only one country has oil, and this
oil is very near the border, the probability of conict is between three and four times as
large as when neither country has oil. In contrast, when the oil is very far from the border,
the probability of conict is not signicantly higher than in pairs with no oil. Similarly,
when, both countries have oil, the probability of conict increases very markedly with the
asymmetry in the two countriesoil locations relative to the border.
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Our results are robust to concerns with endogeneity of the location of the border, be-
cause they hold when focusing on subsamples of country pairs where the oil was discovered
only after the border was set; in subsamples where the border looks snaky,and hence
likely to follow physical markers such as mountain ridges and rivers; and in subsamples
where the distance of the oil is measured as distance to a coastline rather than to a land
border. They are also robust to controlling for a large host of country and country-pair
characteristics often thought to a¤ect the likelihood of conict. Since country xed ef-
fects are included, they are also robust to unobservable factors that may make individual
countries more prone to engage in conict.
Most theoretical work on war onset in political science and economics takes the belliger-
entsmotives as given. The objective is rather either to study the determinants of ghting
e¤ort (Hirshleifer, 1991, Skaperdas, 1992), or to identify impediments to bargaining to
prevent costly ghting (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992, Fearon, 1995, 1996, 1997,
Powell, 1996, 2006, Jackson and Morelli, 2007, Beviá and Corchón, 2010).4 Our approach
is complementary: we assume that bargaining solutions are not feasible (for any of the
reasons already identied in the literature), and study how the presence and location of
natural resources a¤ect the motives for war.5
The paper is thus closer to other contributions that have focused on factors that enhance
the incentives to engage in conict. On this, the literature so far has emphasized the role of
trade (e.g., Polachek, 1980; Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 2001; Martin, Mayer and Thoenig,
2008; Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti, 2013), domestic institutions (e.g., Maoz and Russett,
1993; Conconi, Sahuguet, and Zanardi, 2012), development (e.g., Gartzke, 2007; Gartzke
and Rohner, 2011), and stocks of weapons (Chassang and Padró i Miquel, 2010). Natural
resources have received surprisingly little systematic attention in terms of formal modelling
or systematic empirical investigations. Acemoglu et al. (2012) build a dynamic theory of
4These authors highlight, respectively, imperfect information, commitment problems, and agency prob-
lems as potential sources of bargaining failure. See also Jackson and Morelli (2010) for an updated survey.
5Superimposing our model into one of the existing models of bargaining failure would be feasible, but
unlikely to add much further insight. For similar reasons our model does not feature endogenous ghting
e¤ort.
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trade and war between a resource rich and a resource poor country. But their focus is on the
interaction between extraction decisions and conict, and they do not look at geography.
De Soysa et al. (2011) cast doubt on the view that oil-rich countries are targeted by oil-
poor ones, by pointing out that oil-rich countries are often protected by (oil-importing)
superpowers.6
Unlike in the case of cross-country conict, there is a lively theoretical and empirical
literature, nicely summarized in van der Ploeg (2011), on the role of natural resources
in civil conict. The upshot of this literature is that natural-resource deposits are often
implicated in civil and ethnic conict. Our paper complements this work by investigating
whether the same is true for international conict.7
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model
of inter-state conict. Section 3 carries out the empirical analysis, and Section 4 concludes.
Appendix A describes all data in detail, while Appendix B presents additional empirical
results.
6De Soysa et al. also nd that oil-rich countries are more likely to initiate bilateral conict against
oil-poor ones. Colgan (2010) shows that such results may be driven by spurious correlation between being
oil rich and having a revolutionarygovernment. in Appendix B we look at a similar directed dyads
approach and nd that, in our sample, oil-rich countries are relatively less prone to be (classied as)
revisionist, attacker, or initiator of conict, and that their propensity to attack is decreasing in their oil
proximity to the border. This di¤erence in results could be due to di¤erences in sample (we only look at
contiguous country pairs), or methods (we include a full set of country and time xed e¤ects and a much
more extensive list of controls).
7The vast majority of the civil-conict literature focuses on total resource endowments at the country
level (see, e.g. Michaels and Lei, 2011, and Cotet and Tsui, 2013, for recent examples and further refer-
ences), but recently a few contributions have begun exploiting within-country distributional information.
For example, Dube and Vargas (2013) nd that localities producing oil are more prone to civil violence;
Esteban, Morelli and Rohner (2012) nd that groups whose ethnic homelands have larger endowments of
oil are more prone to being victimized; Morelli and Rohner (2011) nd that inter-group conict is more
likely when total resources are more concentrated in one of the ethnic groupshomelands. Harari and
La Ferrara (2012) also nd that local mineral-resources are associated with more conict, though their
main focus is on climate shocks. None of these studies make use of information on the distance of natural
resource deposits from country/region/ethnic homeland borders.
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2 The Model
2.1 Assumptions
The world has a linear geography, with space ordered continuously from  1 to +1: In
this world there are two countries, A and B. Country A initially controls the [ 1; 0]
region of the world, while country B controls [0;+1]: In other words the initial border is
normalized to be the origin. Each country has a resource point (say an oil eld) somewhere
in the region that it controls. Hence, the geographic coordinates of the two resource points
are two points on the real line, one negative and one positive. We call these points GA and
GB, respectively. These resource points generate resource ows RA and RB, respectively.
For simplicity the Rs can take only two values, RA; RB 2 f0; Rg, where R > 0. Without
further loss of generality we normalize R to be equal to 1.8
The two countries play a game with two possible outcomes: war and peace. If a conict
has occurred, there is a new post-conict boundary, Z. Intuitively, if Z > 0 country A has
won the war and occupied a segment Z of country B. If Z < 0 country B has won. The
implicit assumption here is that in a war the winner will appropriate a contiguous region
that begins at the initial border.
We make the following assumptions on the distribution of Z.
Assumption 1 Z is a continuous random variable with domain R, density f , cumulative
distribution function F , and mean Z.
In sum, the innovation of the model is to see war as a random draw of a new border
between two countries: this makes the model suitable for the study of territorial wars.
Note that the mean Z can be interpreted as an index of (expected) relative strength of the
two countries. If Z > 0 a potential war is expected to result in territorial gains for country
A (the more so the larger Z), so country A can be said to be stronger. If Z < 0 country B
8As we discuss in Section 2.3.2 it is easy to generate comparative static predictions with respect to
changes in RA and RB (and hence, implicitly, with respect to changes in oil prices). But data limitations
and identication issues prevent us from testing these predictions. Since we do not pursue empirical
predictions with respect to RA and RB , we normalize their values to unclutter the exposition.
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is stronger. Needless to say, since Z is dened on R it is possible for the (expected) weaker
country to win.9
We assume that each countrys objective function is linearly increasing in the value of
the natural resources located in the territory it controls (at the end of the game). This
means that, ceteris paribus, a country would like to maximize the number of oil elds it
controls.
Besides the oil, there is an additional cost or benet from conict, bi, i = A;B, which
is a catch-all term for all the other considerations that a¤ect a countrys decision to go to
war. We treat bi as a random variable, to reect that conict is often triggered by political
shocks (domestic or international) that change the cost-benet analysis of going to war.
In particular, we think of bi as typicallybeing negative, reecting the very high costs
that war brings in terms of casualties, destruction, and expense. However, there also is
a positive tailto its distribution, reecting the fact that sometimes countries have very
compelling ideological or political reasons to ght wars. For example, governments facing
a collapse in domestic support have been known to take their countries to war to shore up
their position by riding nationalist sentiments. In other cases they have felt compelled (or
at least justied) to take action to protect the interests of co-ethnic minorities living on
the other side of the border.
We make the following assumption on the distribution of the bis.
Assumption 2 bi, i = A;B is a continuous random variable dened on R, with density
h and cumulative distribution function H. Further, h(b)=h( b) < H(b)=H( b) for b > 0.
The last statement in the assumption is the important one. It implies that h() is
single-peaked, and that it peaks at a negative value of b, since, as discussed, most of the
time the net non-territorial costs of violent conicts (deaths and destruction) exceed the
9For simplicity, we treat Z as an exogenous parameter. The important qualitative results remain
unchanged if we endogenize Z using a standard contest-success-function approach. However, in order to
maintain analytical tractability, strong functional form assumptions are required. The results are available
from the authors upon request.
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benets.10 Note that the assumption also implies h(b)=h( b) > H(b)=H( b) for b < 0.
For simplicity we have implicitly assumed that the distribution H is the same for
both countries, and that the two draws of bi are independent. We discuss relaxing these
assumption below.
This discussion results in the following payo¤ functions. If the outcome is peace, the
payo¤s are simply RA for country A and RB for country B, as by denition there is no
border change (and hence also no change in property rights over the oil elds). Similarly,
we have (implicitly) dened b as a net benet of conict so the bs do not enter the payo¤s
in case of peace.
If there has been a war, the payo¤s are:
UCA = RAI(Z > GA) +RBI(Z > GB) + bA;
UCB = RAI(Z < GA) +RBI(Z < GB) + bB;
where UCi is the payo¤ for country i after a conict, and I() is the indicator function.
The rst two terms in each payo¤ function are the oil wells controlled after the war. For
example, country A has hung on its well if the new border is to the right of it, and
similarly it has conquered Bs oil if the new border is to the right of it. The last term
represents the non-territorial costs or benets from war. Note that implicitly (and for
simplicity) we assume that countries are risk neutral.11 ;12
10In principle, not all single-peaked functions that peak at a negative value of b need to satisfy the con-
dition in the proposition. However, the condition will be satised in all cases where either h is symmetric,
or H is log-concave. The vast majority of commonly-used distributions dened on R are either symmetric
or log-concave (or both).
11Our payo¤ functions implicitly assume that the value of the oil elds is the same in case of war or
without. It would be fairly trivial to allow for some losses in the value of the oil in case of conict. For
example we could assume that conquered oil only delivers R to the conqueror, with  2 (0; 1]. The
statements of our propositions would become slightly messier, but the qualitative predictions would be
unchanged.
12In order to use our framework to study other aspects of territorial war, it will typically make sense
that Z enters directly into the payo¤ functions, reecting that countries may care about their territorial
size per se (which in our model is equivalent to the measure of the real line it controls). For example,
controlling more territory provides more agricultural land to exploit, or more people to tax. Indeed in a
10
The timing and actions of the model are as follows. First, each country i draws a
benet of conict bi, i = A;B. Then each country decides whether or not to declare war,
and does so to maximize expected payo¤s. If at least one country declares war, war ensues.
In case of war, nature draws the new boundary, Z. Then payo¤s are collected.
2.2 Analysis
It is convenient to focus the analysis on the probability that peace is the outcome. This
requires both countries to prefer peace (conditional on their draw of b), which occurs if
E(UCA )  RA and E(UCB )  RB, and where the expectation is taken after observing bi.
Given assumption 1 these conditions can be rewritten as
bA +RB [1  F (GB)]  RAF (GA); (1)
bB +RAF (GA)  RB [1  F (GB)] : (2)
These expressions clearly convey the basic trade-o¤ countries face in deciding whether to
initiate a conict (over and above the trade-o¤s that are already subsumed in the bi terms):
conict is an opportunity to seize the other countrys oil, but also brings the risk of losing
ones own. Crucially, the probabilities of these two events depend on the location of the
oil elds. Consider the decision by country A. If its own oil is very far from the border
(GA, and hence F (GA), is small) then country A is relatively unlikely to lose the oil, which
makes it in turn less likely to choose peace. Similarly, if country Bs oil is nearer the border
(GB small, so 1   F (GB) large), the prospects of capturing Bs oil improve, and A once
again is less likely to opt for peace.
Remark: The case where RA = 0 (RB = 0) is isomorphic to the case where GA !  1
(GB !1).
For the purposes of evaluating the likelihood of peace, it makes no di¤erence if one
country does not have oil, or its oil is located innitely far from the border. This observa-
tion, which follow directly from inspection of equations (1) and (2), simplies slightly the
previous version of this paper we added the term +Z ( Z) to the expression for UCA (UCB ). However this
addition complicates the statements of our results, so we have dropped these terms in the current version
to focus on the mechanism we are interested in.
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presentation of the results, as it implies that the cases where only one or neither country
have oil are limiting cases of the case where both countries have oil.
Thanks to the latest remark, we can denote the probability of peace as P (GA; GB), i.e.
simply as a function of the location of the oil elds. In particular, with some slight abuse
of notation, we denote the probability of peace when only country A has oil (no country
has oil) as P (GA;1) (P ( 1;1)). Then equations (1) and (2), together with Assumption
2, imply
P (GA; GB) = H( x)H(x);
where
x   RAF (GA) +RB [1  F (GB)] :
We then obtain the following predictions:
Proposition 1
(i) P (GA;1)  P ( 1;1);
(ii) @P (GA;1)=@GA  0;
(iii) P (GA; GB)  P ( 1;1);
(iv) P (GA;1)  P (GA; GB) if and only if 1  F (GB)  2F (GA);
(v) @P (GA; GB)=@GA  0 if and only if 1  F (GA)  F (GB)  0:
Proof: Parts (i), (iii), and (iv) of the proposition use the fact that the function
H( x)H(x) is symmetric around 0, increasing for x < 0 and decreasing for x > 0. We
also have @x=@GA > 0, so @P=@G < 0 if @P=@x < 0, or x > 0. This translates into the
statements in parts (ii) and (v).
The proposition enumerates ve testable implications about how the presence and
location of oil a¤ects the likelihood of conict among two countries. Parts (i), (iii), and
(iv) compare the likelihood of conict when neither, only one, or both countries have oil.
Parts (ii) and (v) look at how the likelihood varies with the location of the oil. In the rest
of the section we discuss what these predictions say and how they come about within the
logic of the model.
Part (i) of the proposition establishes that conict is more likely when one country
has oil than when neither country does. Recall that a discovery of oil in one country has
opposite e¤ects on each countrys incentives to go to war. The country which found the
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oil becomes less likely to wish to get into a conict because it has more to lose, while the
other country has an additional potential prize from going to war. The proposition says
that the latter e¤ect systematically dominates, so the likelihood of conict goes up.
Figure 2: E¤ect of oil presence and location on incentives to ght
To see why typically the appearance of oil in one country increase the likelihood of
conict, refer then to Figure 2. The bell-shaped curve is the function h(b), assumed to be
symmetric in this particular picture. Imagine an initial situation where neither country
has oil. In this case country A (B) prefers peace if bA  0 (bB  0), so the area under the
h curve and to the left of 0 represents the probability that either country prefers peace.
Now suppose that oil appears in country A, at location G0A. Country A prefers peace if
bA  F (G0A) and country B prefers peace if bB   F (G0A). Hence, relative to the no-oil
case, country As desire for peace increases by the shaded area between 0 and F (G0A),
while country Bs preference for peace decreases by the shaded area between  F (G0A) and
0. It is immediately apparent that the latter e¤ect dominates, giving rise to part (i) of the
proposition.
Intuitively, the appearance of the oil means that country A is now unwilling to ght
even for some positive values of the non-territorial benet bA. But positive values of bA
are relatively rare events: most of the time the non-territorial consequences of conict
are losses (deaths, destruction, expenses). Hence, the presence of the oil eliminates cases
that are relatively infrequent to start with. On the other hand, the presence of the oil
in country A makes B willing to ght even for some negative realizations of bB. But
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negative realizations of b are more frequent than positive ones, so overall there are more
congurations of (bA,bB) that lead to conict.
Part (ii) says that when oil is only in one country the probability of conict increases
when oil moves closer to the border. To see, this, refer again to Figure 2, and just imagine a
further increase in GA to G00A > G
0
A (not drawn): one can immediately see that the further
change has similarly asymmetric e¤ects on the two countriesincentives for conict. The
intuition is along the same lines as the one o¤ered for part (i).
Part (iii) of the proposition tells us that two countries both having oil are more likely
to experience a conict than two countries both not having oil. Oil always makes one
country more aggressive, and this is enough to trigger more conicts. In this sense under
our assumptions the mere presence of oil is always a threat to peace.
Part (iv) compares the situation when both countries have oil to the situation when
only country A has oil. It says that the discovery of oil in the second country will typically
defuse tensions. The intuition is that the second country to nd the oil will typically be
the country initially responsible for most conict between the two. When this country
nds oil, it becomes less aggressive, as it is concerned with the possibility of losing it.
Country A does become more aggressive, but this is typically insu¢ cient to create a more
belligerent atmosphere, unless the oil in country A was initially much further away from the
border than the new oil discovered in country B which is the meaning of the conditioning
statement in part (iv). Unconditionally, i.e. without knowledge of the locations of the two
countriesoil elds, we expect pairs where both countries have oil to engage in less conict
than pairs where only one does.
Finally, part (v) looks at the marginal e¤ect of moving oil towards the border in one
country, while leaving the other countrys oil location unchanged. To better understand
this condition, it is useful to look at the following special case.
Corollary
If Z = 0 (the two countries have equal strength), and f is symmetric, then
@P (GA; GB)=@GA  0 if and only if jGAj  GB:
In other words, when both countries have oil, changes in distance that increase the
asymmetry of oil locations tend to increase conict. To see the intuition, we can recycle
Figure 2. Consider starting from a situation of perfect symmetry, or  GA = GB. When f
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is symmetric, the incentive to ght for the other countrys oil exactly cancels out with the
deterrent e¤ect from fear of losing ones oil (cf. equations (1) and (2)). Hence, the condition
to prefer peace is bi  0, i = A;B, much as in the case where neither country has oil. Now
consider breaking symmetry by increasing GA to, say, G0A. The condition for A changes to
bA  F (G0A) F (GA), which is positive, while for B it changes to bA   [F (G0A) F (GA)].
Hence the e¤ects of breaking symmetry can be deduced from Figure 2 by simply replacing
F (G0A) by [F (G
0
A)   F (GA)]. The conditioning statement in the proposition generalizes
this intuition, as F (GA) will tend to be larger than 1 F (GB) when GA is closer to border
than GB:13
The empirical part of the paper tests predictions (i)-(v).
2.3 Discussion
2.3.1 Conict and border changes
The key modelling choice we have made is to think of international wars as potentially
border-changing events. The long (and very incomplete) list of examples of territorial
wars and militarized border disputes in the Introduction supports this assumption. The
International Relations literature provides further systematic evidence. Kocs (1995) has
found that between 1945 and 1987 86% of all full-blown international wars were between
neighboring states, and that in 72% of wars between contiguous states unresolved disputes
over territory in the border area have been crucial drivers. The unstable nature of borders
is well recognized. According to Anderson (1999) about a quarter of land borders and some
two-thirds of maritime borders are unstable or need to be settled. Tir et al. (1998) identify,
following restrictive criteria, 817 territorial changes between 1816 and 1996, many of which
are the result of international conicts. According to Tir et al. (1998) and Tir (2003) 27%
of all territorial changes between 1816 and 1996 involve full-blown military conict, and
47% of territorial transfers involve some level of violence. Weede (1973: 87) concludes that
13However in the case where f is not symmetric jGAj  GB is not su¢ cient for movements away from
symmetry to generate more conict. The prediction could be overturned if the country whose oil is moving
towards the border is much stronger militarily (i.e. if F is very skewed in its favor).
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"the history of war and peace is largely identical with the history of territorial changes as
results of war."
The data described in the next section supports the existing evidence. In our panel of
country pairs 0.4% of all observations feature border changes (corresponding to 90 cases
of border change). Yet, conditional on the two countries being in conict with each other,
the incidence of border changes goes up to 7.4%. In other words the probability of a
border change increases 19-fold in case of war.14 In the appendix we reinforce the message
from these simple calculations by conrming that conict remains a signicant predictor
of border changes after controlling for time and country xed e¤ects. Indeed we go further
and show that the presence and location of oil elds has some predictive power for border
changes, despite the very infrequent occurrence of such changes.
Having said that, it is also important to stress that the model emphatically does not
predict that all conicts will be associated with border changes. All of our results and
calculations allow for the distribution of Z to have a mass point at 0. Indeed, a signicant
mass point at 0 appears likely in light of the gures above.
It is also important to point out that, strictly speaking, the distribution function f
need not be the true distribution of post-conict border locations Z. f is the distribution
used by the decision-makers in the two countries, so the discussion so far essentially as-
sumes that policymakers have correct beliefs about the distribution of outcomes in case
of war. Anecdotal observation suggests that overoptimism is often a factor in war and
peace decisions, so our guess is that the objective numbers cited above are probably lower
bounds on the probabilities assigned by leaders to their chances of moving the border in
case of war. For example, it seems likely that Saddam Hussein overstated his chances of
permanently shifting the borders of Iraq with Iran (rst) and Kuwait (later).
14Conversely, while only 6% of observed country pairs are in conict, 30% of country pairs experiencing
a border change are in conict.
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2.3.2 Allowing for Variation in R
With our assumption that R 2 f0; 1g we have normalized all non-zero oil endowments.
It is trivial to relax this assumption to look at the e¤ects of changes in RA and RB. In
particular, as implied by our Remark above, an increase in RA has identical qualitative
e¤ects of a movement of As oil towards the border, while an increase in RB is akin to a
move of Bs oil towards the border. Our propositions can therefore readily be reinterpreted
in terms of changes in quantities. Unfortunately, testing these predictions would require
data on oil eld-level endowments that we have no access to. Potentially, predictions for
changes in the Rs might be tested using variation in oil prices, as an oil price increase is
an equiproportional increase in both RA and RB. For example, for the case where only
one country has oil, our theory would predict that increases in oil prices tend to lead to
an increase in the likelihood of conict. However, ample anecdotal evidence suggests that
short-term oil prices are very responsive to conicts involving oil-producing countries, so it
would be very di¢ cult to sort out a credible causal path from oil prices to conict. Another
issue is that what matters for war should be the long-term oil price: it is not clear that
current oil prices are good forecasts of long-run ones.
2.3.3 Oil as a Source of Military Strength
In our model the discovery of oil in one country tends to make this country less aggressive,
as it fears losing the oil, and the other more aggressive, as it wishes to capture it. We may
call this a greede¤ect. However, the discovery of oil may also provide the discoverer with
nancial resources that allow it to build stronger military capabilities. If oil rich countries
are militarily stronger, they might also be more aggressive as the odds of victory go up.
Their neighbors may also be more easily deterred. Hence, there is a potential strength
e¤ect that goes in the opposite direction to the greede¤ect.15 To address this potential
15The strengthe¤ect could easily be added to our model by making Z an increasing function of RA
and a decreasing function of RB . However, this would not be enough to fully bring out the ambiguity
discussed in the text. For example, it is easy to see that parts (i)-(iii) of our Proposition would still go
through exactly unchanged. Hence, it would still be the case that, e.g., discovery of oil in one country
unambiguously leads to greater likelihood of conict. This is because in our model the only territorial
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ambiguity, we make three observations, in increasing order of importance.
First, the whole premise that oil should make a country militarily stronger may be
somewhat dubious, as a large literature argues that there is a resource curse which
lowers incomes in oil-rich countries (see Ross, 2012, for a very comprehensive overview).
Second, while the fact of having oil may have some ambiguous implications through the
opposing strengthand greede¤ects, the geographical location of the oil should only
matter through greed. Oil will increase resources for ghting irrespective of its location, but
the risk of losing it will be more severe if the oil is near the border. Hence, our predictions
concerning the e¤ect of oil location on conict which are the focus for our most distinctive
empirical results should be una¤ected by the strength argument. As mentioned in the
Introduction, this is one key reason to focus on the geographic distribution of the oil in
the empirical work.
Third, even if we dont model the strength e¤ect explicitly, in our empirical work
we are able to fully control for it. First, in all our specication we include the GDP
of each country in each pair. Since the strength e¤ect operates principally by making
a country richer, controlling for GDP should absorb most of this mechanism. Second,
lest one may worry that oil revenues are more easily turned into weapons than non-oil
revenues, we further control for a measure of military capabilities.If having oil allows a
country to build a more powerful army the index of military capabilities should account for
this. Third, just in case oil riches per se make countries more aggressive through channels
not picked up by GDP and military capabilities, we also present a battery of robustness
checks where we include various measures of each countrys aggregate oil endowments.16
benet of conict is oil merely being stronger does not make country A more aggressive. In footnote 12
we have alluded to a previous version of the model where countries have territorial aspirations over and
above the control of oil (i.e. Z enters the payo¤ function). In that model the strengthe¤ect is present
and the empirical predictions are correspondingly a bit more ambiguous.
16Note that while we do not have data on oil-eld-level oil endowments, we do have data on country-level
oil endowments. The former would be required to test the comparative statics of the model with respect
to RA and RB , i.e. the e¤ect of endowments through the greede¤ect. The latter are su¢ cient to test
for the strengthe¤ect, which depends only on aggregate endowments matter, and not on their spatial
distribution.
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To anticipate, not only such robustness checks do not a¤ect our headline results, but also
we nd very little evidence that overall oil endowments play an independent role in causing
conict. This result casts doubt on the importance of the strengthe¤ect, consistent with
the rst of our observations above.
2.3.4 Identical distributions for bA and bB
The assumption that the bA and bB are drawn from identical distributions could potentially
be relaxed. For example, a natural extension would be to assume that bA (bB) is positively
(negatively) related to Z, i.e. that the country that expects the largest territorial gains
also expects the largest non-territorial ones (or to pay a less devastating non-territorial cost
for the conict). A relatively tractable special case of this is to assume that the country-
specic distributions hA and hB each satisfy Assumption 2, but di¤er in their means bA
and bB, with 0 > bA > bB if Z > 0 and bA < bB < 0 otherwise. Under these assumptions
numerical simulations using normal distributions suggest that our results are fairly robust.
For example, in order to reverse part (ii) of our proposition, it needs to be the case that
country A must have a much larger non-territorial benet from conict (i.e. bA >> bB).
The closer is the oil to the border, the larger the required di¤erence in bs. The intuition
is that a much larger bA tends to make country A the relatively more aggressive country
(despite being the one having the oil). Hence, as the oil moves towards the border, the
deterrent e¤ect on A is the dominant factor, leading to more peaceful relations. Since our
result is (numerically) robust to all combinations of bA and bB such that bB > bA, as well
as many combinations such that bA > bB, we conclude that unconditionally, i.e. without
the possibility to condition on measures of bB > bA, we expect the result to hold for the
typical country pair.
3 Empirical Implementation
3.1 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.1.1 Sample
We have constructed a panel dataset, where an observation corresponds to a country pair
in a given year, e.g. Sudan-Chad in 1990. The country pairs are selected from the country
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list in the "Correlates of War" (2010, CoW) data set. From the universe of country
pairs in CoW, a country pair is included in our data set if it meets a direct contiguity
criterion, as dened in the "Correlates of War Direct Contiguity Data" (Stinnett et al.,
2002). This criterion is that the two countries must either share a land (or river) border,
or be separated by no more than 400 miles of water. There are 606 pairs of countries
satisfying this criterion.17 The dataset covers the years 1946-2008.
All variables are described in detail in Appendix A, which also contains Table 7 with
summary descriptive statistics. Here we focus on the key dependent variable and the
independent variables of interest.
3.1.2 Dependent Variables
Our main dependent variable is a measure of inter-state dispute, from the "Dyadic Mil-
itarized Interstate Disputes" data set of Maoz (2005), which is an updated and dyadic
(i.e. at the country-pair level) version of the original Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID)
dataset (Jones, Bremer, and Singer, 1996). The MID data is the most widely used data on
interstate hostilities.18 Compared to alternative (and less widely used) data sets such as
the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conict Dataset (Uppsala Conict Data Program, 2011) the
MID data has the advantage of not only including the very rare full-blown wars between
states, but also smaller scale conicts, and to provide a relatively precise scale of conict
intensity.
In Maoz (2005) interstate disputes are reported on a 0-5 scale. The highest value, 5, is
reserved for sustained combat, involving organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum
of 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities within a twelve month period.This extremely
violent form of confrontation, which we will refer to as War, is very rare: only 0.4% of our
observations meet this criterion. The next highest value, 4, is for Blockade, Occupation
of territory, Seizure, Attack, Clash, Declaration of war, or Use of Chemical, Biological, or
17Approximately 60% of the country pairs in the sample are separated by a land or river border.
18Related papers in economics using this data include for example Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008),
Besley and Persson (2009), Glick and Taylor (2010), Baliga, Lucca and Sjöström (2011) and Conconi,
Sahuguet, and Zanardi (2012).
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Radioactive weapons.While still very violent, this type of confrontation, which is labelled
Use of Force,is much more frequent, occurring in as many as 5.2% of our observations.
Accordingly, we construct our main dependent variable, which we call Hostilityby com-
bining all episodes of War and Use of Force.19 We also present robustness checks using
War only,20 or including disputes receiving a value of 3 in Maoz (2005).21
An alternative approach is to investigate data which identies the aggressor in a bilat-
eral conict (as in Colgan (2010) and De Soysa et al. (2011)). However, in many cases,
identication of the aggressor requires subjective and possibly unreliable judgments. Fur-
thermore, if a country perceives a potential threat, it may choose to attack rst, and it
is not clear that data focusing on the direction of attack are always able to account for
such preemptive strikes.22 We submit that our approach based on distance of the oil from
the border o¤ers a more robust strategy. Having said this, in Appendix B we use data
from Maoz (2005) to look at how the presence and the distance of the oil from the border
di¤erentially a¤ect the likelihood that the oil rich or the oil poor country is classied as
"revisionist", "attacker" or "initiator of conict". We nd robust evidence that oil-rich
countries are less likely to be classied any of the above categories, and that this e¤ect
becomes stronger as the oil gets closer to the border. There is also fairly strong evidence
that countries are more likely to be classied as revisionist towards neighbors that have
oil, the more so the closer the oil is to the border.
Another alternative dependent variable potentially consistent with our theory is border
19It is standard practice in the empirical literature on international conict to aggregate over more
than one of the Maoz (2005) categories. For example, Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008) and Conconi,
Sahuguet, and Zanardi (2012) code a country pair to experience conict when hostility levels 3, 4 or 5 are
reached.
20The dataset from Maoz (2005) only runs until 2001. As alternative data on full-blown wars is readily
available, when we check the results using "War" we update this variable using the UCDP/PRIO Armed
Conict Dataset (Uppsala Conict Data Program, 2011).
21Disputes receive a mark of 3 when they meet the criterion of "Display use of force", which is reserved
for "Show of force, Alert, Nuclear alert, Mobilization, Fortify border, Border violation".
22See, e.g., Gaubatz (1991), Gowa (1999), Potter (2007), and Conconi, Sahuguet, and Zanardi (2012),
for more detailed versions of these and other criticisms of the direct dyadapproach.
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changes. However, recall from our discussion in Section 2.3 that our theory is consistent
with a mass point at 0 for the distribution of border changes following a conict. Fur-
thermore, the theory is consistent with subjective assessments by key decision makers that
overstate the likelihood of border changes following a conict. For both these reasons we
think that the occurrence of conict, rather than the actual occurrence of a border change,
better captures the forces at work in our model. In addition, because of these consider-
ations border change is an extremely rare event: only 0.4% of our observations feature a
border change. Hence, we expect regressions focussing on border change to have very little
power. Having said all this, in Appendix C we do report results using as dependent variable
a dummy variable for border change (constructed from Tir et al., 1998), and still nd some
support for a role for oil and oil location - though the coe¢ cients are, not surprisingly, less
consistently signicant than using Hostility.
3.1.3 Explanatory Variables of Interest
Our main independent variables are one-period lagged measures of the presence and dis-
tance of oil elds in each country in the pair from the bilateral border or from the other
countrys coastline. To construct these we have combined two sources. The rst source
is the CShapes dataset of Weidmann, Kuse and Gleditsch (2010), which contains histor-
ically accurate geo-referenced borders for every country and year. The dataset accounts
for border changes over time, both the ones originating from state creation and split-ups,
and those arising from border adjustments. Their border adjustment information is based
on Tir et al. (1998).
The second source is a time varying and geo-referenced dataset on the location of
oil and gas elds from Lujala, Rod and Thieme (2007, PETRODATA). It includes the
geo-coordinates of hydrocarbon reserves and is specically designed for being used with
geographic information systems (GIS). In total, PETRODATA consists of 884 records for
onshore and 378 records for o¤shore elds in 114 countries. Note that PETRODATA
includes all oil and gas elds known to exist, including those not yet under production,
which is clearly appropriate given that incentives to appropriate will likely be similar for
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operating and not-yet-operating elds.23
Using Geographical Information System (GIS) software, we merge these two data sets
so that we can pinpoint each oil eld position vis-a-vis a countrys borders as well as vis-
a-vis the coastline of neighboring countries. Then, for each country pair and for each oil
eld belonging to one of the two countries, we measure the oil elds minimum distance to
the other countrys land border, as well as the minimum distance to the coastline of the
other country. The oil elds distance to the other country is then the minimum of these
two.24 The minimum oil distance from the other country is the minimum across all oil
eldsminimum distances.
On the basis of these data, we have constructed the following ve explanatory variables.
"One" is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when only one country in the pair has
oil. Similarly, "Both" takes a value of 1 if both countries of the pair have oil. The omitted
baseline category hence is the case where none of the countries in the pair has oil. "One
x Dist" is the product of the Onedummy with the distance of the oil from the border.
Similarly, "Both x MinDist" is the product of the Bothdummy and the minimum of the
distances of the oil from the border in the two countries. Analogously, "Both x MaxDist"
captures the distance from the border in the country whose oil is further from the border.
Note that an increase in "Both x MinDist" (holding "Both x MaxDist" constant) is a
movement towards symmetry, while an increase in "Both x MaxDist" (holding "Both x
23The main data sources of PETRODATA include World Petroleum Assessment by U.S. Geological
Survey (USGS, 2000), Digital database on Giant Fields of the World by Earth Sciences and Resources
Institute at the University of South Carolina (ESRI-USC, 1996), and World Energy Atlas by Petroleum
Economist (Petroleum Economist, 2003).
24Needless to say in many cases there is no land border and in many others there is no coastline, so in
these cases the distance variable is just the distance from the coastline (border).
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MinDist" constant) is a movement away from symmetry.25
In our main specications, all the distance variables are normalized to lie between 0
and 1, to reduce their range, and constructed so that there are diminishing marginal
costs from geographical distance. In particular, the functional form is 1   e d, where d
is the crude geographical distance (in Kms). The idea for the diminishing costs is that
conquering the rst Km in the enemys territory may be a more momentous decision than
conquering the 601st Km when one has already captured the rst 600. In any case we
present robustness checks for alternative re-scaling or crude unscaled distances.
3.1.4 Control Variables
We include several control variables. Because our distance measures could potentially be
mechanically correlated with country size, and country size could potentially a¤ect conict
independently, in all regressions we control for the maximum and minimum land area in
the pair (i.e. if in a country pair the larger country has a land area of x, and the smaller
one a land area of y, the maximum land area variable for this pair-year takes the value x,
while the minimum area variable takes the value of y). Such minimum-maximum variables
are standard in the literature studying country pairs.
Besides land area, which is always included, most specications also include a set of
baseline controlssuggested by the conict literature. These are: minimum and maximum
population, minimum and maximum GDP per capita, minimum and maximum ghting
capabilities, minimum and maximum democracy scores, the number of consecutive years
the two countries have been at peace before the current period, bilateral trade / GDP, a
dummy for membership in the same defensive alliance, two dummies for civil war incidence
in one or both of the countries in the pair, and two dummies for OPEC membership of one
25The attentive reader will have noticed that, in constructing our key dependent variables, we have
taken the min operator three times: rst, for each oileld in a country, between its distance to the other
countrys border and the other countrys coastline (distance of oileld to other country); second, for each
country, among all its oileldsdistances to the other country (minimum oil distance to other country);
and, third, between the two countriesminimum oil distances (MinDist). MaxDist is the max between the
two countriesminimum oil distances.
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or both countries in the pair.26 Finally, in important robustness checks we discuss later,
we further include several variables on the amounts of oil production and reserves in the
two countries. Again, all variables are explained in detail in Appendix A.
3.1.5 Specication and Methods
Our benchmark specication is a linear-probability model that takes the form
HOSTILITYd;t+1 =  +  Onedt +  (One x Dist)dt
+ Bothdt +  (Both x MinDist)dt + ! (Both x MaxDist)dt
+X0dt + ud;t;
where d indexes country pairs, t indexes time, and X is the vector of afore-mentioned
controls. We consider alternative functional forms (including probit and logit) in robustness
checks.
Crucially, our preferred specication for the error term ud;t includes a full set of coun-
try dummies as well as a full set of time dummies. This implies that the key source of
identication for, say, the e¤ect of Oneis the relative propensity of a given country to
experience conict with its oil-rich neighbors and with its oil-poor neighbors. We will nd a
positive estimate of  when the same country has more conicted relations with its oil-rich
neighbors. The identication of the other coe¢ cients is driven by similar within-country
comparisons, e.g. is a given country more likely to nd itself in conict with a neighbor
whose oil is near the border than with one whose oil is far away from the border.
In all regressions the standard errors are clustered at the country-pair level. In principle,
26Population and GDP could a¤ect the likelihood of conict in myriad ways, e.g. through the tax base;
ghting capabilities directly a¤ect the chances of success, so clearly enter the calculation of whether to
engage in conict; democracy scores are included to account for the democratic peacephenomenon (Maoz
and Russett, 1993); joint membership in alliances or in OPEC may o¤er countries venues to facilitate the
peaceful resolution of conicts; previous history of conict is meant to absorb unobserved persistent factors
leading to conict between the two countries; recent history of domestic civil wars captures one factor that
may weaken one country and tempt the other to take advantage; bilateral trade has been found to matter
for bilateral conict by Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008).
25
we could go further and include a full set of country-pair dummies. Identication of the oil-
related coe¢ cients would then be driven by (i) oil discoveries, which switch the dummies
Oneand Bothfrom 0 to 1, as well as potentially changing the distance measures (if
the newly-discovered eld is closer to the border than all the pre-existing elds); and (ii)
changes in borders. Unfortunately there are too few (relevant) oil discoveries and border
changes in our dataset to provide su¢ cient power for identication. Accordingly, when
we do include a full set of country-pair dummies (and two-way cluster the standard errors
at the country level), most coe¢ cients retain the sign of the benchmark results, but lose
statistical signicance.27
3.2 Results
Table 1 displays the baseline regressions for the main dependent variable, Hostility. In the
rst three columns we use all oil elds to construct our main variables, while in columns
4-6 we only use o¤shore oil, and in columns 7-9 only onshore oil. In column 1 we show
the coe¢ cients on our variables of interest only after controlling for annual time dummies
and minimum and maximum land area. In column 2 we add country xed e¤ects, and in
column 3 we further add the full set of baseline controls discussed above. The estimates
are reasonably stable across the three specications, though statistical signicance tends
to improve as we add country xed e¤ects and the further controls.
The specication with the full set of country xed e¤ects and controls (column 3) is
our preferred specication. In this specication, both the presence and geographic location
of the oil are statistically signicant predictors of bilateral conict. As predicted by the
model a country pair with one or both countries having oil is signicantly more prone to
inter-state disputes than a pair with no oil whatsoever (which is the omitted category).
More importantly, when only one country has oil, the likelihood of conict signicantly
drops when the oil is further away from the border. Similarly, when both countries have
oil, the likelihood of conict is decreasing in the distance from the border of the oil that is
27In particular in our preferred model in Column 3 of Table 1 only the coe¢ cient on Both remains
signicant at conventional condence levels (results available on request).
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closest to the border - a movement towards symmetry. The only prediction of the model
for which the support is weak concerns the distance of the furthest oil eld: while the sign
of the coe¢ cient is positive, as predicted, it is not statistically signicant.
Quantitatively, the e¤ect of geographic location is very sizeable. Figure 3 shows the
probability of conict implied by the regression coe¢ cients in Column 3 as a function of
the oils distance from the border (when all the controls are set at their average values). As
already noted, the average risk of conict in our sample is 5.7 percent. This drops to 3.1
percent for country pairs in which neither country has oil. In contrast, when one country
in the pair has oil, and this oil is right at the border (Distance = 0), the probability of
conict is almost 4 times as large: 11.6 percent. But this greater likelihood of conict is
very sensitive to distance. Indeed when the oil is located at the maximum theoretical value
for our distance measure (Distance = 1) the likelihood of conict is similar to the likelihood
when neither country has oil.28 The last two bars in the gure look at the case where both
countries have oil. In the rst instance, asymmetry is maximal: one country has oil right at
the border (MinDist=0), the other at the maximum distance (MaxDist=1). The likelihood
of conict is almost three times as large as in the case where neither country has oil, or
8.6 percent. In the second instance, we look at a case of perfect symmetry: both countries
have oil at a distance that is one half of the maximum distance (MinDist=MaxDist=0.5).
The likelihood of conict is a much more modest 4.1 percent.29
28Hence, our models formal isomorphism between the cases of no oil and innitely distantoil seems
to also hold empirically.
29In constructing Figure 3 we have used the coe¢ cient on the interaction term between the oil in two
countriesdummy and the maximum distance variable even though it is statistically insignicant. Because
it is a very small number, however, using 0 instead has only a minor e¤ect on the quantities in the table.
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Dependent variable: Hostility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
One 0.034 0.049* 0.085*** 0.087 0.143*** 0.136*** 0.048 0.058* 0.141***
(0.032) (0.027) (0.030) (0.054) (0.048) (0.037) (0.042) (0.033) (0.044)
One x Dist -0.050 -0.073*** -0.091*** -0.107* -0.138*** -0.128*** -0.079* -0.103*** -0.144***
(0.035) (0.026) (0.027) (0.056) (0.048) (0.036) (0.044) (0.033) (0.041)
Both 0.022 0.034 0.055* 0.023 0.110*** 0.079** 0.009 0.020 0.058*
(0.021) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.035) (0.031) (0.024) (0.032) (0.033)
Both x MinDist -0.077** -0.105*** -0.092*** -0.088* -0.107** -0.064* -0.102*** -0.122*** -0.128***
(0.035) (0.030) (0.029) (0.047) (0.051) (0.033) (0.038) (0.032) (0.036)
Both x MaxDist 0.026 0.016 0.002 0.048 0.012 -0.012 0.059 0.047 0.041
(0.040) (0.030) (0.029) (0.065) (0.065) (0.044) (0.043) (0.034) (0.038)
Type Oil All All All Offshore Offshore Offshore Onshore Onshore Onshore
Country FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Add. Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 19962 19962 11401 19962 19962 11401 19962 19962 11401
R-squared 0.019 0.145 0.158 0.020 0.145 0.155 0.021 0.146 0.160
Note: The unit of observation is a country pair in a given year. The sample covers all direct contiguous country pairs of the Correlates of
War list and the years 1946-2001. OLS regressions with intercept in all columns.  Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In all
columns robust standard errors clustered at the country pair level in parenthesis. All independent variables are taken as first lag. All
specifications control for minimum and maximum land areas and annual time dummies (not displayed). In addition, columns 2, 3, 5, 6, 8,
and 9 include country fixed effects for each country of the dyad. In addition, columns 3, 6, and 9 include the following set of unreported
control variables: Minimum population, maximum population, minimum GDP per capita, maximum GDP per capita, minimum democracy
score, maximum democracy score, minimum capabilities, maximum capabilities, dummy for one country having civil war, dummy for both
countries having civil war,  bilateral trade / GDP, defensive pact, dummy for one country being OPEC member, dummy for both countries
being OPEC member, and years since the last hostility in the country pair.
Table 1: Baseline results for Hostility
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Figure 3: Quantitative effects
Dependent variable: War
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
One 0.005 0.008 0.018*** 0.026* 0.029* 0.041*** 0.007 0.013 0.021**
(0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008)
One x Dist -0.007 -0.010 -0.012** -0.030* -0.032** -0.040*** -0.011 -0.016 -0.018**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007)
Both 0.004 0.009 0.021** -0.005** 0.003 0.009 0.005 0.012 0.018**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
Both x MinDist -0.003 -0.008* -0.008 0.001 0.006 0.001 -0.004 -0.008** -0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Both x MaxDist -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 0.001 -0.015** -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
Type Oil All All All Offshore Offshore Offshore Onshore Onshore Onshore
Country FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Add. Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 23768 23768 11401 23768 23768 11401 23768 23768 11401
R-squared 0.005 0.073 0.101 0.009 0.075 0.107 0.006 0.073 0.102
Note: The unit of observation is a country pair in a given year. The sample covers all direct contiguous country pairs of the Correlates of
War list and the years 1946-2008. OLS regressions with intercept in all columns.  Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In all
columns robust standard errors clustered at the country pair level in parenthesis. All independent variables are taken as first lag. All
specifications control for minimum and maximum land areas and annual time dummies (not displayed). In addition, columns 2, 3, 5, 6, 8,
and 9 include country fixed effects for each country of the dyad. In addition, columns 3, 6, and 9 include the following set of unreported
control variables: Minimum population, maximum population, minimum GDP per capita, maximum GDP per capita, minimum democracy
score, maximum democracy score, minimum capabilities, maximum capabilities, dummy for one country having civil war, dummy for both
countries having civil war,  bilateral trade / GDP, defensive pact, dummy for one country being OPEC member, dummy for both countries
being OPEC member, and years since the last war in the country pair.
Table 2: Baseline results for War
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Dependent variable: Hostility (coded as 1 for conflict intensity levels 3,4 and 5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
One 0.036 0.051* 0.089*** 0.101* 0.167*** 0.180*** 0.049 0.054 0.145***
(0.033) (0.030) (0.032) (0.060) (0.051) (0.042) (0.044) (0.037) (0.043)
One x Dist -0.059* -0.083*** -0.099*** -0.131** -0.173*** -0.169*** -0.086* -0.111*** -0.151***
(0.035) (0.027) (0.028) (0.063) (0.051) (0.040) (0.045) (0.035) (0.041)
Both 0.033 0.037 0.064* 0.020 0.106*** 0.097*** 0.020 0.019 0.062
(0.024) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.040) (0.034) (0.027) (0.036) (0.038)
Both x MinDist -0.092** -0.131*** -0.113*** -0.112* -0.139** -0.087** -0.127*** -0.152*** -0.161***
(0.041) (0.035) (0.033) (0.058) (0.060) (0.035) (0.048) (0.042) (0.049)
Both x MaxDist 0.025 0.021 0.002 0.071 0.034 0.004 0.069 0.059 0.057
(0.047) (0.035) (0.031) (0.076) (0.073) (0.043) (0.054) (0.042) (0.050)
Type Oil All All All Offshore Offshore Offshore Onshore Onshore Onshore
Country FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Add. Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 19962 19962 11401 19962 19962 11401 19962 19962 11401
R-squared 0.024 0.155 0.177 0.025 0.155 0.175 0.027 0.156 0.179
Note: The unit of observation is a country pair in a given year. The sample covers all direct contiguous country pairs of the Correlates of
War list and the years 1946-2001. OLS regressions with intercept in all columns.  Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In all
columns robust standard errors clustered at the country year level in parenthesis. All independent variables are taken as first lag. All
specifications control for minimum and maximum land areas and annual time dummies (not displayed). In addition, columns 2, 3, 5, 6, 8,
and 9 include country fixed effects for each country of the dyad. In addition, columns 3, 6, and 9 include the following set of unreported
control variables: Minimum population, maximum population, minimum GDP per capita, maximum GDP per capita, minimum democracy
score, maximum democracy score, minimum capabilities, maximum capabilities, dummy for one country having civil war, dummy for both
countries having civil war,  bilateral trade / GDP, defensive pact, dummy for one country being OPEC member, dummy for both countries
being OPEC member, and years since the last hostility in the country year.
Table 3: Baseline results for the "broad" definition of Hostility (taking a value of 1 for intensity levels 3, 4 and 5)
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The remaining columns in the table investigate whether the results are driven partic-
ularly by o¤shore or onshore oil. In particular, in columns 4-6 we construct our variables
of interest using exclusively information on o¤shore oil elds (so, e.g., if in a country pair
all the oil is onshore the pair is treated as a no oilpair), and then repeat the three spec-
ications with no controls, only country dummies, and all baseline controls. In columns
7-9 we do the same for onshore oil. It turns out that the coe¢ cients on the variables of
interest and patterns of signicance are quite similar for o¤shore and onshore oil (and thus
to the baseline case). Hence, if the mechanism driving the results is the one implied by
our theory, it seems that having another countrys oil near ones coastline is as tempting
as having it near ones border.
3.2.1 Robustness
Alternative dependent variables Table 2 presents results from the same set of spec-
ications as in Table 1, but using the more stringent denition of conict, namely "War".
Because of the very infrequent occurrence of "War" (sample mean 0.004), these regressions
have much less statistical power than those using Hostility, and some of our variables of
interest accordingly lose statistical signicance. Nevertheless, perhaps surprisingly, the
coe¢ cients on the One and Two dummies, as well as the coe¢ cient on Distance, remain
signicant (when including the full set of controls, and with the exception of Two in the
case of o¤shore oil). Quantitatively, the coe¢ cients are smaller than when using Hostility,
though the impact of distance on War is still economically very sizable.30.
In a similar spirit, Table 3 presents results using a denition of conict broader than
Hostility, namely including conicts classied as having intensity 3 in the Maoz data set.
The results are very similar to the ones using our baseline Hostility measure, with the co-
e¢ cients of most of our key variables being sizeable and highly signicant for our preferred
specication of column 3.
30For example, while in an average country pair the risk of war is 0.4% per year, this risk goes up to
2.6% which is more than 6 times higherin the most dangerous conguration where only one country in
the pair has oil and when it is located right at the border.
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Alternative distance scales, functional forms, subsamples To further assess the
robustness of our results, Table 4 presents variants of our preferred specication of column
3 of Table 1. In column 1 we re-scale the distance of oil elds from the border using a
plain natural log function (recall that so far we have measured distance as 1  e d, where
d is raw distance in hundreds of Kms), while in column 2 we use raw oil distance. The
results are very similar to the ones of the benchmark regression. In columns 3, 4 and 5
we replace our linear probability model with, respectively, logit, probit and rare events
logit (ReLogit) estimators.31 The results are again very similar to our benchmark.32 To
further reduce unobserved heterogeneity, in column 6 we restrict the sample to country
pairs where one or both of the countries have oil (hence dropping all country pairs without
any oil). The results of the benchmark continue to hold in this restricted sample. In
column 7 we show that our results are robust to dropping country pairs including Israel, a
country that has been involved in frequent conict in an oil-rich region of the world (but
not necessarily because of oil). Finally, column 8 shows that our results are also robust to
dropping country pairs with oil elds that straddle the border (i.e. for which MinDist=0).
This indicates that the ndings are not driven by hostilities arising from di¢ culties in
managing common-pool resources.
31The rare events logit (ReLogit) estimator is from Tomz, King, and Zeng (2003), and adjusts the
estimation for the fact that the dependent variable takes much more often a value of 0 than of 1. The
ReLogit estimator is not designed for the inclusion of xed e¤ects and for robust standard errors. Hence,
we remove all xed e¤ects and use standard errors without the robust option, but still clustered at the
country-pair level.
32Note that the sample size drops in columns 3 and 4 with the logit, resp. probit estimators as countries
with no variation in the dependent variable (i.e. countries being in all periods in peace with all their
neighbors) drop from the sample when country xed e¤ects are included.
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Dependent variable: Hostility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
One 0.060* 0.052*** 2.800*** 1.162** 0.783* 0.074** 0.085***
(0.034) (0.018) (1.006) (0.452) (0.451) (0.029) (0.030)
One x Dist -0.005** -0.009*** -3.297*** -1.458*** -0.955** -0.093*** -0.082*** -0.092***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.851) (0.389) (0.473) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027)
Both 0.061* 0.056** 1.018 0.377 0.370 -0.029 0.052* 0.056**
(0.032) (0.025) (0.631) (0.297) (0.306) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028)
Both x MinDist -0.006*** -0.012** -2.185*** -1.169*** -1.264*** -0.096*** -0.055** -0.091***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.503) (0.250) (0.482) (0.030) (0.024) (0.029)
Both x MaxDist -0.001 -0.006** 0.206 0.167 0.168 0.003 -0.027 -0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.500) (0.257) (0.448) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029)
Sample All All All All All Only I1, I2 w/o Israel w/o Dist. 0
Estimator OLS OLS Logit Probit ReLogit OLS OLS OLS
Country FE and TE Yes Yes Yes Yes NO Yes Yes Yes
Scale distances Nat.log. in 100 km Standard Standard Standard Standard Standard Standard
Observations 11401 11401 8939 8939 11401 9937 11256 11392
R-squared 0.154 0.161 0.318 0.308 0.228 0.170 0.155 0.158
Note: The unit of observation is a country pair in a given year. The sample covers all direct contiguous country pairs of the Correlates of
War list and the years 1946-2001. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In all columns robust standard errors clustered at
the country pair level in parenthesis. The oil variables are constructed using all oil fields (onshore and offshore). All independent
variables are taken as first lag. All specifications control for intercept, minimum and maximum land area, minimum population,
maximum population, minimum GDP per capita, maximum GDP per capita, minimum democracy score, maximum democracy score,
minimum capabilities, maximum capabilities, dummy for one country having civil war, dummy for both countries having civil war,
bilateral trade / GDP, defensive pact, dummy for one country being OPEC member, dummy for both countries being OPEC member, and
years since the last hostility in the dyad. All columns, with the exception of the ReLogit regression in column 5, also include country fixed
effects and annual time dummies.
Table 4: Robustness with respect to Estimator and Sample
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Oil endowments In Section 2.3.3 we noted that countries with oil might experience
more frequent conict simply because oil revenues confer resources that can be spent in
weaponry and other military capabilities. Our regressions already control for GDP and
a measure of military capability, so in principle this e¤ect should indirectly already have
been absorbed by these variables. Perhaps more importantly, even if the presence of oil
inuences military capability, it is hard to see how distance from the border should matter
for this particular mechanism. It is precisely this observation that underscores one of
the benets of focusing on the geographic distribution of the oil elds. Having said all
that, in order to make sure that our distance variables do not spuriously correlate with oil
endowments, in Table 5 we perform further robustness checks with respect to the overall
quantitative endowments of oil in the two countries in each pair.33 Specically, we control
(in turn) for the minimum and maximum of: oil output (column 1), estimated oil reserves
(2), and oil output as a share of GDP (3). Further, we control for oil output in the country
with oil closest to the border, and in the country with oil further from the border (column
4).
We can make three broad observations from the results of Table 5. First, and most
important, the results relating to distance of the oil from the border are very robust, both
in magnitude and in statistical signicance, to controlling for the overall oil endowments.
Second, the One and Two dummies are less systematically signicant, especially the latter.
While a small part of the reduced signicance of the two dummies is due to the inclusion
of the quantity variables (which is not surprising as by construction these dummies are
correlated with the oil output/endowment measures), most of the e¤ect is due to a drop in
the sample size.34 Third, the oil output/endowment variables are only rarely statistically
signicant predictors of conict, possibly because their inuence is already captured by the
33Recall that we do not have oileld-level information on endowments, so we cannot test the models
predictions with respect to oileld size.
34In particular, when running the regressions of columns 1 to 3 on the same reduced sample but with-
out including the quantity measures, "One" becomes also insignicant in column 2, and "Both" is also
insignicant in all three of the columns. In column 4 "Both" becomes signicant at the 10% level when
running the regression on the reduced sample but without including the quantity variables.
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controls for GDP and for military capabilities. Interestingly, though, when these variables
are signicant they imply that more asymmetric endowments are associated with greater
likelihood of conict.35
3.2.2 Endogenous Borders
In interpreting our regressions so far we have implicitly assumed that borders are located
randomly in space - or at least without consideration for the presence and location of the
oil. There may be reasons to query this identifying assumption, as the process by which
borders come about may be a¤ected by the spatial distribution of oil elds. Indeed in our
own model the ex-post border is certainly endogenous to the oils location, since countries
enter into (potentially) border-changing conict with a view of capturing each others oil.
But even ex-ante borders, i.e. borders drawn before countries have made conict-peace
decisions, could have been inuenced by the location of oil. For example, a country with
more bargaining power might have insisted on deviating somewhat from naturalborders
in order to insure oil elds remained on its side. Or, colonial powers might have chosen
to draw post-colonial borders so as to make sure that oil elds are located in the country
more likely to be friendly to its interests - or perhaps so as to divide the oil elds between
the two countries in order to diversify the risk of disruption arising from turbulence in any
one country.
In order to address these concerns, we follow three distinct strategies. The rst strategy
is to focus on observations were we know that the border predates the discovery of oil. The
second strategy is to focus on observations in which the border has the physical appearance
of a natural border. The third strategy is to focus on observations in which the distance
variables are distances of the oil from a coastline, which are necessarily exogenous.
We begin with borders that were drawn/set before the oil was discovered. By construc-
tion, if the parties do not know the oil is there, they cannot be inuenced by its presence
when drawing the border or ghting over territory. We implement two versions of this
35This is because it is the "min" variable that tends to show up as signicant, and with a negative
coe¢ cient, so an increase in this variable reduces asymmetry and is associated with less conict.
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Dependent variable: Hostility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
One 0.103*** 0.027 0.098*** 0.090**
(0.038) (0.080) (0.038) (0.036)
One x Dist -0.122*** -0.107*** -0.117*** -0.102***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
Both 0.048 -0.107 0.043 0.053
(0.038) (0.140) (0.038) (0.033)
Both x MinDist -0.077*** -0.088*** -0.079*** -0.072***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
Both x MaxDist -0.011 0.000 -0.006 -0.014
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Oil Prod.(max) -0.002
(0.001)
Oil Prod.(min) -0.006*
(0.003)
Oil Res.(max) -0.011
(0.062)
Oil Res.(min) 0.066
(0.077)
Oil/GDP(max) -0.042
(0.038)
Oil/GDP(min) -0.133**
(0.067)
Oil Prod. (further) 0.001
(0.001)
Oil Prod. (closer) -0.001
(0.001)
Country FE, TE, all controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9331 6206 8991 9814
R-squared 0.167 0.197 0.161 0.161
Note: The unit of observation is a country pair in a given year. The sample covers all direct contiguous
country pairs of the Correlates of War list and the years 1946-2001. Significance levels *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. In all columns robust standard errors clustered at the country pair level in parenthesis.
The oil variables are constructed using all oil fields (onshore and offshore). All independent variables are
taken as first lag.  OLS with intercept in all columns. All specifications control for minimum land area,
maximum land area, minimum population, maximum population, minimum GDP per capita, maximum
GDP per capita, minimum democracy score, maximum democracy score, minimum capabilities, maximum
capabilities, dummy for one country having civil war, dummy for both countries having civil war, bilateral
trade / GDP, defensive pact, dummy for one country being OPEC member, dummy for both countries
being OPEC member, and years since the last hostility in the country pair, country fixed effects and
annual time dummies.
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Table 5: Robustness with respect to oil quantities
idea in columns (1)-(2) and, respectively, (3)-(4) of Table 6. In columns 1 and 2 we drop
from our sample all observations featuring a border that has changed subsequently to the
rst oil discovery in either country in the pair. More specically, we use information from
Lujala, Rod and Thieme (2007) to identify the date at which oil was rst discovered in
either country in the pair, and we use information from Tir et al. (1998) to identify all
dates at which borders changed between the two countries. We then drop from the analy-
sis all observations dated after the rst border change following the rst oil discovery.36
Because this procedure as well as all other procedures examined in this tableinvolves a
signicant drop in sample size, and because our full set of controls induces further losses
due to missing values, we report specications without (column 1) and with (column 2)
controls (and similarly for all other experiments). Whether we include the full set of con-
trols or not, the results of columns 1 and 2 show that our key ndings are statistically and
economically robust to dropping borders that changed after oil discoveries.
The exercise in columns (1) and (2) is suitable to remove concerns with ex-post en-
dogeneity, i.e. with border changes in response to oil discoveries. However, it is still
potentially vulnerable to ex-ante endogeneity, i.e. with the position of the oil a¤ecting
the drawing of the original borders. To address ex-ante endogeneity, in columns (3) and
(4) we further drop all country pairs which rst came to share a border (for example
when one or both countries rst came into existence) after oil was rst discovered in ei-
ther of them.37 Again, despite the substantial drop in sample size, our headline results on
36Hence, if toil is the date at which oil was rst discovered in either country, and t1, t2, t3, ... are the
ordered dates of border changes (i.e. ti > ti 1), we (i) dene ~{ such that t~{ 1 < toil and t~{  toil, and
(ii) drop all observations dated t > t~{. Note that if oil was discovered in a country pair before 1946, and
the border experienced one or more changes between the date of discovery and 1946, the country pair is
dropped entirely from the analysis. Also note that we do not observe border changes before 1816, so t1
is the rst border change after 1816. However oil was a nearly valueless commodity before 1816 so any
border change before that date cannot conceivably have been motivated by oil.
37Following on the same notation, denote now t0 the date at which the border between two countries
rst came in existence. We now drop all the same observations as in columns (1) and (2) and, in addition,
all those satisfying toil  t0. As before, however, all pairs where the border was drawn before 1816 (which
is the start date of the Correlates of War data on state creation) are kept in the analysis, on the ground
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minimum distance turn out to be robust.
Our second strategy to assess the threat to identication posed by endogenous borders
is to drop country pairs whose borders look articial.This strategy, inspired by recent
work by Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski (2011), consists on building, for each bilateral
land border, a measure of the deviation of the actual border from a relatively smooth arc
(see the appendix for a detailed description). We name this variable border snakiness.
The idea is that the smoother the border (the less snakyit is), the more likely it is to
have been designed articially, while the more snakyit is, the more likely it is to follow
natural geographical features like mountain ridges or rivers. Based on this reasoning, in
columns (5) and (6) we re-estimate our baseline specications (with and without the full
set of controls) only on the subset of country pairs with above median snakiness. Once
again despite the massive loss of sample size the key results appear robust (except for the
coe¢ cient on Both x MinDist,which loses signicance in the specication with the full
set of controls).
that oil could not have inuenced these borders even if its presence was known at the time. To nd out the
earliest establishment of current borders for all pairs, we have used data from Strang (1991), Correlates
of War (2010), CIA (2012) and Encyclopedia Britannica (2012). Note that we use the date of the rst
drawing of the currently active borders, even if this date is earlier than independence, e.g. when borders
were already drawn in colonial times.
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Dependent variable: Hostility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
One 0.052* 0.097*** 0.019 0.055** 0.130*** 0.113*** 0.072** 0.219*
(0.029) (0.035) (0.027) (0.025) (0.037) (0.036) (0.031) (0.122)
One x Dist -0.079*** -0.112*** -0.042* -0.073*** -0.127*** -0.101*** -0.061** -0.210*
(0.027) (0.033) (0.024) (0.023) (0.035) (0.028) (0.025) (0.123)
Both 0.045* 0.050* 0.007 0.017 0.164*** 0.124** 0.154*** 0.108**
(0.026) (0.028) (0.023) (0.027) (0.052) (0.051) (0.056) (0.047)
Both x MinDist -0.100*** -0.050* -0.083*** -0.069*** -0.135** -0.071 -0.157** -0.038
(0.030) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.062) (0.043) (0.073) (0.041)
Both x MaxDist -0.011 -0.037 0.026 0.007 -0.018 -0.057 0.016 -0.056
(0.038) (0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.071) (0.057) (0.081) (0.045)
Sample
No border changes (bc)
after oil discovery
No bc after oil disc.,
historical borders older than
oil disc. or 1816
Removed 50% with least
"snaky" border
Only country pairs without
land border
Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 16504 9572 11771 7290 9907 5481 8168 4423
R-squared 0.151 0.151 0.231 0.147 0.187 0.200 0.172 0.166
Note: The unit of observation is a country pair in a given year. The sample covers all direct contiguous country pairs of the Correlates of War list
(unless noted otherwise) and the years 1946-2001. OLS regressions with intercept in all columns.  Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. In all columns robust standard errors clustered at the country pair level in parenthesis. All independent variables are taken as first lag. All
specifications use the same unreported controls as the benchmark specification of column (2) of Table 1: Country fixed effects for each country of
the country pair, annual time dummies, and minimum and maximum land areas. In addition, the specifications (2), (4), (6) and (8) also include all
unreported controls from column (3) of Table 1: Minimum and maximum population, minimum and maximum GDP per capita, minimum and
maximum democracy scores, minimum and maximum capabilities, dummy for one country having civil war, dummy for both countries having civil
war,  bilateral trade / GDP, defensive pact, dummy for one country being OPEC member, dummy for both countries being OPEC member, and
years since the last hostility in the country pair.
Table 6: Controlling for potentially endogenous or artificial borders
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Our third and nal strategy to assuage concerns with endogeneity builds on the fact
that coastlines, as opposed to land borders, are (mostly) exogenous to human activity.
Recall that our sample contains both country pairs that share a land border and country
pairs that do not share a land border but are separated by less than 400 miles of water. In
the latter case, by construction, all our oil distance variables are distances of oil elds to the
other countrys coastline. Because both the oil location, and the position of the coastline
are natural phenomena, it is di¢ cult to think of plausible mechanisms that would lead
these distances to respond to incentives by the two countries in the pair. Accordingly, in
columns (7) and (8) of Table 6 we re-estimate our main specications (with and without
the full set of controls) on the subsample of pairs that do not share a land border.38 Even
with this most restrictive criterion for inclusion in the sample we nd that our headlines
results largely hold, the only exception being once again the loss of signicance on Both
x MinDistwhen the full set of controls is included.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the e¤ect of natural resource endowments, as well as their
geographic distribution, on the risk of inter-state conict. We have built a simple model
that predicts the risk of inter-state disputes to be largest in the presence of natural resource
asymmetry. The most dangerous situations are the ones where only one country of the
pair has oil, and this oil is close to the border. When both countries have oil, conict risk
is maximal when the location of oil elds is maximally asymmetric.
We have tested these predictions empirically with a novel geo-referenced dataset de-
38Note that by construction the subset for the results in columns (7) and (8) is a strict subsample of the
corresponding samples in the other columns of this table. This is because we have treated coastlines as
pre-existing any oil discovery (so all country pairs without a land border are retained in columns (1)-(4))
and because we have treated all bodies of water separating countries (other than rivers) as natural,and
hence assigned maximum snakiness to country pairs that do not share a land border (so all country pairs
without a land border are included in columns (5)-(6)). Recall that only about 40% of country pairs do
not share a land border. It may also be appropriate to note that in this subsample about 50% of the pairs
have the closest oil onshore.
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signed to capture these geographical asymmetries. Controlling for a battery of determi-
nants of bilateral conict, as well as country xed e¤ects and annual time dummies, we
nd large quantitative e¤ects from asymmetric oil location. For example, country pairs
where only one country has oil near the border are as much as four times more likely to
engage in conict than country pairs with no oil, or where the oil is very far from the
border, and still much higher than when both countries have oil near the border. These
results are robust to several strategies to deal with the potential endogeneity of bilateral
borders.
While our theoretical model is novel and has the advantage of simplicity, it also has
several limitations. The theoretical framework is static, and is thus unable to capture a
host of interesting dynamic e¤ects. This is a priority for future work. Empirically, the
priority is to complement our data on oil eld location with data on oil eld size and
reserves. Finally, our theory applies equally, and our empirical methods could be usefully
applied to, mineral natural resources other than oil.
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Appendix A: Data
This appendix describes the variables used in section 3, and provides summary descriptive
statistics in Table 7. The dependent variables, "Hostility", "War" and "Hostility (broad
denition, coded as 1 when intensity is 3 or above)" have been explained in detail in
subsection 3.1. We now explain the dependent variables used in Appendices B and C,
respectively.
"Revisionist": We use the variable "revstata" ("revstatb") of Maoz (2005) which takes
a value of 1 if "State A is revisionist" ("State B is revisionist"), and 0 otherwise. Note
that it is possible that in a country pair either both, one or neither of the countries
are revisionist. Having constructed dummy variables for "revisionist", we construct our
dependent variable for Appendix B as the di¤erence between the dummy for the rst-listed
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country in the pair (country A) and the dummy for the second-listed country (country B).
This variable can be interpreted as a measure of relative aggressiveness of country A. This
allows us to run a specication quite similar in spirit to the benchmark model we used
for the other dependent variables. In particular, we estimate the impact on the relative
aggressiveness of A of: oil in country A, distance of country As oil to the border, oil in
country B, and distance of country Bs oil to the border.
"Attacker": We use the variable "sideaa" ("sideab") of Maoz (2005) which takes a value
of 1 if "State A is on Side A of MID" ("State B is on Side A of MID"), and 0 otherwise,
where "Side A" refers to the initiator side. Having constructed dummy variables for
"attacker", we construct our dependent variable for Appendix B as the di¤erence between
the dummy for the rst-listed country in the pair (country A) and the dummy for the
second-listed country (country B). This variable can be interpreted as a measure of relative
aggressiveness of country A. This allows us to run a specication quite similar in spirit to
the benchmark model we used for the other dependent variables. In particular, we estimate
the impact on the relative aggressiveness of A of: oil in country A, distance of country As
oil to the border, oil in country B, and distance of country Bs oil to the border.
"Initiator": We use the variable "rolea" ("roleb") of Maoz (2005) and re-code it as
1 when the variable takes a value of 1, i.e. when country A (country B) is coded as
"Principal initiator", and 0 otherwise. Having constructed dummy variables for "initiator",
we construct our dependent variable for Appendix B as the di¤erence between the dummy
for the rst-listed country in the pair (country A) and the dummy for the second-listed
country (country B). This variable can be interpreted as a measure of relative aggressiveness
of country A. This allows us to run a specication quite similar in spirit to the benchmark
model we used for the other dependent variables. In particular, we estimate the impact
on the relative aggressiveness of A of: oil in country A, distance of country As oil to the
border, oil in country B, and distance of country Bs oil to the border.
"Territorial Change": Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if there has been a terri-
torial change in a given pair year. From Tir et al. (1998), version 4.01 obtained from
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/.
The explanatory variables One, Both, Dist, MinDist, and MaxDist have also been
described in the detail in the main text. The others are as follows.
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"Land area": In 1000 Square kilometers. From World Bank (2009).
"Population": In Millions. From Heston, Summers, and Aten (2009).
"GDP per Capita": Real Gross Domestic Product per Capita (in 1000), Current Price
National Accounts at PPPs. From Heston, Summers, and Aten (2009).
"Polity Score": Democracy scores ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly
democratic). From Polity IV (2009).
"Capabilities": Capability scores from Correlates of War (2010).
"CW1": Dummy with value of 1 if there is a civil war in one country of the pair, and
0 otherwise. Constructed using data from Uppsala Conict Data Program (2011).
"CW2": Dummy with value of 1 if there is a civil war in both countries of the pair,
and 0 otherwise. Constructed using data from Uppsala Conict Data Program (2011).
"Bilateral trade /GDP": Sum of total bilateral trade between the two countries of the
pair divided by the sum of their total GDPs. Bilateral trade data from Barbieri and Keshk
(2012), GDP data from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2009).
"Defensive pact": Dummy taking a value of 1 if the countries of the pair are together
in a defense pact, and 0 otherwise. From Correlates of War (2010).
"OPEC1": Dummy with value of 1 if one country in the pair is an OPEC member,
and 0 otherwise. From OPEC (2012).
"OPEC2": Dummy with value of 1 if both countries in the pair are OPEC members,
and 0 otherwise. From OPEC (2012).
"Number of years since the last hostility, resp. war between the countries in the pair":
Authorscalculations, based on the "hostility", "war", resp. "hostility (broad denition)"
variables.
"Oil production": In 10 million tones (mean = 3). From British Petroleum (2009).
"Oil reserves": In 100 billion barrels. From British Petroleum (2009).
"Oil production/GDP": Total value of current oil production / GDP. Production quan-
tities and prices from British Petroleum (2009), corresponding GDP in current prices from
World Bank (2009).
"Border snakiness": Authors calculations. Using the geo-referenced shapes of bilateral
country borders from Weidmann, Kuse, and Gleditsch (2010), we compute an index of
bilateral border snakiness, using the following formula: "Border snakiness" = "Actual
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bilateral border length" / (0.5 * "Convex hull below the bilateral border" + 0.5 * "Convex
hull above the bilateral border"). This measure takes a value of 1 when the border is a
straight line, while its value increases when the border becomes more winding, resp. snaky.
Appendix B: Directed Dyads
The results of the regressions with directed dyads are displayed in Table 8.
Appendix C: Border Changes
The results of the regressions with border changes are displayed in Tables 9 and 10.
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Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Hostility 20564 0.057 0.233 0 1
War 24387 0.004 0.066 0 1
Hostil. (Int. 3, 4 and 5) 20564 0.072 0.259 0 1
State A revisionist 19965 0.011 0.216 -1 1
State A attacker 19965 0.006 0.263 -1 1
State A initiator 19965 0.008 0.256 -1 1
Border change 24387 0.004 0.061 0 1
One 24387 0.349 0.477 0 1
One x Dist 24387 0.285 0.424 0 1
Both 24387 0.512 0.500 0 1
Both x MinDist 24387 0.253 0.382 0 1
Both x MaxDist 24387 0.332 0.431 0 1
Land area (min) 24366 366.135 906.894 0.002 9632.030
Land area (max) 24366 2294.900 4146.070 0.340 17098.200
Pop. (min) 20418 9.459 17.791 0.017 234.694
Pop. (max) 20418 54.522 117.102 0.064 1129.870
GDP p.c. (min) 18075 4.129 5.710 0.088 57.259
GDP p.c. (max) 18075 8.070 9.461 0.118 104.707
Democracy (min) 20055 -2.664 7.115 -10 10
Democracy (max) 20055 2.835 7.242 -10 10
Capabilities (min) 20489 0.003 0.010 0 0.177
Capabilities (max) 20489 0.022 0.043 3.00E-06 0.364
CW1 24387 0.263 0.440 0 1
CW2 24387 0.041 0.197 0 1
Bilat. Trade / GDP 17201 0.003 0.007 0 0.121
Defensive pact 19948 0.389 0.488 0 1
OPEC1 24387 0.134 0.340 0 1
OPEC2 24387 0.025 0.157 0 1
Oil prod. (min) 18854 0.532 2.390 0 49.870
Oil prod. (max) 18854 5.377 10.881 0 56.950
Oil res. (min) 13965 0.020 0.121 0 1.384
Oil res. (max) 13965 0.176 0.461 0 2.643
Oil/GDP (min) 17907 0.023 0.093 0 1.037
Oil/GDP (max) 17907 0.104 0.187 0 1.213
Border snakiness 24387 1.929 0.744 1 2.757
Border snak. (alt. def.) 24387 1.171 0.235 1 2.757
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
State A revisionist State A attacker State A initiator
Oil A -0.022 -0.044** -0.029* -0.006 -0.022 -0.041*** -0.006 -0.024 -0.041***
(0.014) (0.019) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Oil A x MinDist A 0.033** 0.032** 0.039** 0.027* 0.033* 0.038*** 0.029* 0.037** 0.039***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
Oil B 0.031* -0.004 0.003 0.008 -0.007 -0.008 0.004 -0.014 -0.016
(0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Oil B x MinDist B -0.035** -0.025* -0.019 -0.014 -0.021 -0.022 -0.011 -0.017 -0.014
(0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Country FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Add. Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 19962 19962 11401 19962 19962 11401 19962 19962 11401
R-squared 0.006 0.058 0.095 0.005 0.046 0.054 0.006 0.048 0.059
Note: The unit of observation is a country pair in a given year. The sample covers all direct contiguous country pairs of the Correlates of War
list and the years 1946-2001. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In all columns OLS regressions are run, with robust standard
errors clustered at the country pair level in parenthesis. All independent variables are taken as first lag. The dependent variable in the
columns 1-3 is the dummy of country A being revisionist minus the dummy of country B being revisionist (hence the dependent variable
takes values of -1, 0, and 1). The construction of the dependent variable is analogous for columns 4-6 and 7-9 with being attacker, resp.
initiator instead of revisionist as underlying variable. All specifications control for land areas of both countries and annual time dummies (not
displayed). In addition, columns 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9 include country fixed effects for each country of the country pair. In addition, columns 3, 6,
and 9 include the following set of unreported control variables for both countries in the pair: Population, GDP per capita, democracy score,
capabilities, dummy for having a civil war,  bilateral trade / GDP, defensive pact, dummy for being OPEC member, and years since the last
hostility in the country pair.
Table 8: Regressions with Directed Dyads
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Border Change
Hostility 0.018*** 0.015***
(0.006) (0.004)
War 0.070*** 0.064***
(0.022) (0.020)
Country FE No No Yes Yes
Observations 20564 24387 20564 24387
R-squared 0.013 0.014 0.033 0.031
Note: The unit of observation is a country pair in a given year. The sample covers
all direct contiguous country pairs of the Correlates of War list and the years 1946-
2008. OLS regressions with intercept in all columns.  Significance levels *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In all columns robust standard errors clustered at the dyad
level in parenthesis. All specifications control for annual time dummies (not
displayed).
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Table 9: Conflict and Border Changes
Dependent variable: Border change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
One 0.002 0.004 0.005* 0.014* 0.017** 0.020* 0.002 0.004 0.005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
One x Dist -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.016** -0.019** -0.021** -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Both 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.008* 0.006 0.011** 0.003 0.005** 0.011** 0.009
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006)
Both x MinDist 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Both x MaxDist -0.006* -0.009*** -0.006 -0.008 -0.010* 0.001 -0.002 -0.006* -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Type Oil All All All Offshore Offshore Offshore Onshore Onshore Onshore
Country FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Add. Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 23768 23768 11401 23768 23768 11401 23768 23768 11401
R-squared 0.011 0.027 0.035 0.012 0.027 0.037 0.011 0.026 0.035
Note: The unit of observation is a country pair in a given year. The sample covers all direct contiguous country pairs of the Correlates of War list
and the years 1946-2008. OLS regressions with intercept in all columns.  Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In all columns robust
standard errors clustered at the country pair level in parenthesis. All independent variables are taken as first lag. All specifications control for
minimum and maximum land areas and annual time dummies (not displayed). In addition, columns 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, and 9 include country fixed effects
for each country of the dyad. In addition, columns 3, 6, and 9 include the following set of unreported control variables: Minimum population,
maximum population, minimum GDP per capita, maximum GDP per capita, minimum democracy score, maximum democracy score, minimum
capabilities, maximum capabilities, dummy for one country having civil war, dummy for both countries having civil war,  bilateral trade / GDP,
defensive pact, dummy for one country being OPEC member, dummy for both countries being OPEC member, and years since the last border
change in the country pair.
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